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Abstract
Recent risk sharing tests strongly reject the hypothesis of complete markets, because in
the data: (1) the individual consumption comoves with income and (2) the consumption
dispersion increases over the life cycle. In this paper, I revisit the implications of these risk
sharing tests in the context of a complete market model with discount rate heterogeneity,
which is extended to introduce the individual choices of e¤ort in education. I nd that
a complete market model with discount rate heterogeneity can pass both types of the
risk sharing tests. The endogenous positive correlation between income growth rate and
patience makes the individual consumption comove with income, even if the markets are
complete. I also show that this model is quantitatively admissible to account for both
the observed comovement of consumption and income and the increase of consumption
dispersion over the life cycle.
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1 Introduction
The hypothesis of complete markets, which is widely used in macroeconomics and nance,
has recently been strongly rejected by a number of risk sharing tests which exploit the mi-
cro data sets of consumption and income distributions. Some authors (Attanasio and Davis
1996, Blundell, Preston and Pistaferri 2008, BPP hereafter), using constructed panel data of
consumption and income, nd that the individual or group consumption comoves signicantly
with income. Others, using consumption data only, nd that the cross-sectional dispersion of
consumption increases signicantly over the life cycle (Deaton and Paxson 1994, Heathcote et
al. 2010a). They all argue that if full risk sharing were achievable, the individual consumption
would not respond to the individual income change and the consumption dispersion would be
constant over the life cycle. Therefore, the hypothesis of complete markets should be rejected.
In consequence, this unanimous rejection has motivated more researchers to investigate quan-
titatively the degree of risk sharing in models with the alternative hypothesis of incomplete
markets, using the methodology of the above risk sharing tests (e.g. Storesletten et al. 2004,
Heathcote et al. 2010b, Kaplan and Violante 2010, Sun 2010).
This rejection, however, is premature. In this paper, I revisit the implications of these
risk sharing tests in the context of a complete market model with discount rate heterogeneity,
which is extended to introduce the individual choices of e¤ort in education. I ask: can a
complete market model with discount rate heterogeneity pass both types of the risk sharing
tests? Drawing quantitative implications of this model, I further ask: with plausible parameters
values, is it quantitatively admissible for a complete market model to account for the observed
comovement of consumption and income, the increase of consumption dispersion over the life
cycle, or even both simultaneously?
The model in this paper begins by relaxing the common assumption of homogeneous dis-
count rates. As the individual discount rate is unobservable, researchers use experimental
studies, eld studies or structural estimation to elicit the discount rate1. Most of the experi-
mental and eld studies have reported signicant standard deviations in the estimates. Using
structural estimation by Euler equation residuals, Lawrance (1991) and Alan and Browning
(2006, 2010) strongly reject the hypothesis of homogeneous discount rates. In the macroeco-
nomics literature, the importance of discount rate heterogeneity is also highlighted to account
for the life-time wealth inequality of households with similar earnings proles (Samwick 1998,
1See Frederick et al. (2002) for a survey.
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Krusell and Smith 1998, Hendricks 2007).
In addition, the individual choices of e¤ort in education are introduced into the model. Here
I focus on the (unobserved) education quality, while my model bears the same intuition as the
models of the education quantity such as the (observed) education levels. Consistent with
the model implications, there is strong evidence for the positive correlation between education
level and patience, which is veried in the eld study from U.S. military downsizing (Warner
and Pleeter 2001), in the experiment of Denmark sample with sizable real monetary reward
(Harrison et al. 2002), and in the structural estimation of consumption-and-saving models
(Cagetti 2003, Alan and Browning 2010). The empirical studies also nd that the group with
higher education is associated with higher wage growth rate (e.g. Lillard and Weiss 1979,
Baker 1997, Guvenen 2009, Low, Meghir and Pistaferri 2010). The above two lines of evidence
jointly imply a positive correlation between income growth rate and patience.
The mechanism of my model is as follows. With discount rate heterogeneity, agents with
di¤erent discount rates have di¤erent life cycle consumption paths. Even if markets are com-
plete and consumption paths are deterministic, the consumption dispersion will eventually
increase over the life cycle when their consumption paths diverge. Moreover, the more patient
agent exerts more e¤ort in education because her discounted future return is higher, which
yields higher quality of education and thus higher income growth. As the income growth rate
and the consumption growth rate are both increasing in patience, consumption will statistically
comove with income. Therefore, with discount rate heterogeneity the risk sharing tests arrive
at the conclusion of imperfect risk sharing, even if the markets are actually complete.
This paper contributes to the large literature of the risk-sharing tests since 1990s (e.g.
Cochrane 1991, Mace 1991, Altonji et al. 1992, Townsend 1994, Deaton and Paxson 1994,
Attanasio and Davis 1996, Blundell and Preston 1998, BPP 2008). In particular, it contributes
to the recent researches which cast doubt on the risking sharing tests with the presence of
preference heterogeneity (Mazzocco and Saini 2012, Schulhofer-Wohl 2011, Chiappori et al.
2012). Di¤erent from this paper, these authors focus on the implications of the heterogeneity
in individual risk aversion and nd that the hypothesis of full risk sharing cannot be rejected,
if there exists risk preference heterogeneity. The time preference in this paper, unlike the
risk preference, has no direct relation with risk itself: its comovement of consumption and
income simply comes from the intertemporal choices, not from the mutual insurance or from
the self-selection into risky income as in the models of heterogeneous risk preferences.
Other papers have addressed the importance of preference on the consumption dispersion in
a complete market model. Storesletten et al. (2001) show that the non-separable preferences
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between consumption and leisure in a complete market model could possibly generate an
increase of consumption dispersion over the life cycle, but it also implies a counter-factual age
prole of inequality in hours worked. Badel and Huggett (2012) study in a complete market
setup how the preference shocks can account for the life-cycle prole of both consumption and
hours dispersion. Their focus is the role of preference shifters, not time preferences.
The income process used in this paper is related to the literature of Heterogeneous In-
come Proles (HIP), which is emphasized by Lillard and Weiss (1979), Hause (1980), Baker
(1997) and Guvenen (2009). Without additional information or ad hoc model specication,
it is impossible for the econometricians to tell apart the predictable income change, such as
the heterogeneous income growth rates, from the unpredictable income change, such as the
permanent income shocks. Although the income processes with homogeneous (unexplained)
growth rate are more common in the literature, Primiceri and Rens (2009) estimate a HIP
model and nd that a signicant part of income change over time is predictable. Endogenizing
the heterogeneous income growth rates, this paper is also related to the model focusing on
ex-ante heterogeneity as in Huggett et al. (2011) and pre-work choice as in Keane and Wolpin
(1997).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple example to deliver
the main message from the empirical risk sharing tests. Section 3 develops a complete market
model with discount rate heterogeneity, in which the individual income growth rate is endoge-
nously positively correlated with the individual patience. Section 4 draws the quantitative
implications of the model. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Risk Sharing Tests
The degree of risking sharing can be a¤ected by the nature of market structure and/or the
nature of income risks. To test risking sharing, a growing literature uses the information from
the micro data sets of consumption and income distributions. In terms of the structure of
the data they use, these tests can be classied as two categories: One is to exploit the joint-
distribution of consumption and income. To do this, one has to construct either a synthetic
panel (Attanasio and Davis 1996) or a combined panel data of consumption and income (BPP
2008) and measure the comovement of consumption and income. The other is to use the data
sets of consumption and income distributions separately, study the change of consumption
distribution over the life cycle (Deaton and Paxson 1994) and compare it with the change of
income distribution accordingly. These two types of risk sharing tests share the same core
methodology which can be illustrated by the following example:
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Consider an individual saving problem where she is endowed with a stochastic income
process yit; lives for T periods; and only has access to a risk-free bond with net interest
rate r. Assume further that the period utility is linear quadratic with the discount factor  =
1=(1+r): Assume the borrowing constraints are loose enough to make the rst order conditions
hold. Solving the model analytically yields that the consumption follows a martingale process,
ci;t = 
 1 r
1+r
PT t
s=0
(Et Et 1)yi;t+s
(1+r)s ;where   1 
1
(1+r)T t+1
; which is a textbook version of the
Permanent Income /Life Cycle Hypothesis (PILCH). In the data, we observe the distributions
of consumption and income. If we take an agnostic view of either the market structure or
the income shocks, can we infer their nature from the data? The logic of the risk sharing
tests is: by investigating the comovement of consumption and income and by investigating the
change of consumption dispersion, we can identify the nature of the market structure and/or
the nature of the income risks. To see this, consider three extreme cases of the composition of
the idiosyncratic income yit:
Case A. Pure unit root income shock: yit = zit; and zit = zit 1 + it; where it is the
permanent shock. In this case, yit = it. We can solve analytically cit = it. The
comovement of consumption and income is such that the income innovation passes one-to-one
to the change of consumption. As the consumption is a unit-root process, the dispersion of
consumption increases over the life cycle.
Case B. Pure predictable and heterogeneous income proles: yit = it, where i is the
slope of individual income path. Since all the income changes are predictable, the markets are
complete. Thus we have yit = i and cit = 0: The comovement of consumption and income
is zero, and the dispersion of consumption keeps constant over the life cycle.
Case C. Pure i.i.d. income shock: yit = "it; where "it is the transitory shock. If shocks are
transitory, we have yit = "it "i;t 1 and cit =
r
1+r
 1"it: Notice that   1 if T t is a large
number and r1+r  r if r is a small number. Therefore, cit  r"it with large T   t and small
r: There is a slightly positive comovement of consumption and income, and the consumption
dispersion increases slightly over the life cycle.
The risk sharing tests tell us that we can infer the nature of market structure and/or the
nature of the shocks from two data sources: 1. the empirical comovement of consumption and
income; 2. the empirical dispersion of consumption over the life cycle.
Comovement of consumption and income
To generalize Attanasio and Davis (1996)s idea, BPP (2008) measure the degree of the
transmission of income shocks to consumption growth. They assume that the unexplained log
income can be decomposed into a unit root permanent part and an i.i.d. transitory part; they
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also assume the log consumption as
 log cit = itit +  it"it + uit; (1)
where it is the permanent shock and "it is the transitory shock, uit is the error term.
Since it is the pass-through of permanent income shocks to consumption change, it is a
natural measure of (the lack of) consumption insurance.
To create a panel data series of consumption and income, BPP map food data into expen-
diture data using the estimates of a food demand function, as food data are present in both
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).
BPPs main nding is that, in the whole sample, the estimate of  and  is 0.6423 and 0.0533,
respectively. Hence, they infer that markets are incomplete and people may have access to
more insurance over and above the self-insurance as implied by the PILCH model. They call
it partial insurance.
Consumption dispersion over the life cycle
If we do not have BPPs panel data of consumption and income, we have to rely on the
distribution of consumption and income separately. It is well known that the income distribu-
tion is fanning out over the life cycle. As to the consumption dispersion, Deaton and Paxson
(1994) nd that the consumption dispersion of each cohort increases over the life cycle by 0.28
log points. Using longer time span from 1980 to 2006, Heathcote et al. (2010a) nd that the
variance of log consumption increases over the life cycle by 0.057 when controlling for year
e¤ects and by 0.13 when controlling for cohort e¤ects. While Heathcote et al. (2010a) do not
take a stand on which empirical strategy is better, Heathcote et al. (2005) suggest controlling
for year e¤ects2.
The consensus is that the consumption dispersion increases signicantly over the life cycle.
Hence, they infer that the markets are incomplete and a large part of the income shocks is
very persistent, unpredictable and uninsurable.
The message from all the above risk sharing tests is: either the hypothesis of complete mar-
kets must be rejected or, in the context of a PILCH model, the hypothesis of fully predictable
heterogeneous income proles (Case B) must be rejected, or both. Notice the latter is a special
case of the former. This rejection, however, is premature. In the rest of the paper, I will revisit
2Recently, several authors argue that the diary survey in CEX is better designed than the interview survey.
Attanasio et al. (2007) use the diary survey of the CEX and Attanasio et al. (2010) combine these two surveys.
They nd that the consumption dispersion from 1980 to 2006 rises twice as much as the result from Heathcote
et al. (2010a), who use the interview survey. But they did not report the increase of consumption dispersion
over the life cycle.
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the implication of these tests in a complete market model with discount rate heterogeneity and
endogenous income growth rate.
3 The Model
3.1 The life-cycle problem
Consider an economy populated with a continuum of agents. Agent i is born at age 0 with a
discount factor i, which is drawn from a distribution F with variance 
2
 > 0. Each agents
life cycle consists of two stages: education and working. In the education stage, agent i makes
a decision related to education, which determines her life-cycle income prole. In the working
stage, agent i faces a life-cycle consumption and saving problem, given her income prole
predetermined in the education stage.
The working stage
After l years of education, each agent starts to work at age l; works for T years and dies at
age T + l: In the working stage, each agents income follows a Heterogeneous Income Proles
(HIP) process:
log yit = logw +
tX
=1
i + zit + "it; (2)
zit = zit 1 + it ,
where time t denotes the working tenure. w is the average wage. Focusing on the unex-
plained income change, I assumed away the observed individual xed e¤ect in this process. The
idiosyncratic shocks consist of a permanent (or AR(1) when  < 1) part zit and a transitory
(i.i.d.) part "it, where  2 (0; 1]; it  N(0; 
2
); "it  N(0; 
2
"); zi0 = 0. it is the individual
income growth rate at time t; which is predetermined by the individual education e¤ort choice
in the education stage. In the HIP model as estimated by Guvenen (2009), it is assumed to
be constant over the life cycle and
Pt
=1 i becomes it: If we allow the growth rate to vary,
we can interpret it as the predictable part of income change (though not predictable by the
econometricians), as in Primiceri and Rens (2009) with the restriction of  = 1. Thus, this
HIP model nests both Guvenen (2009) and Primiceri and Rens (2009).
The income shocks at time t are dependent on the stochastic event st 2 S. Denote s
t
as [s1; s2:::; st], which is the history of events up to time t. The unconditional probability of
history st is t(s
t). The markets are assumed to be complete. Without loss of generality, let
us consider the Arrow-Debreu structure in which agents can trade a complete set of contingent
claims dated at t = 1. By the rst and second welfare theorems, the equilibrium allocation is
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Pareto optimal and corresponds to the solution of the social planners problem with a particular
set of Pareto weights. The markets are complete in the sense that for every history st; there
exist a market of contingent claims with time 1 price q1t (s
t) for that history.
Denote i  [i1; i2:::iT ] as the vector of individual income growth rates. The agent is
period utility is assumed to be CRRA with risk-aversion  and her problem in the working
stage is:
V (i; i) = max
TX
t=1
t 1i f
X
st
t(s
t)
[cit(s
t)]1 
1  
g
s:t:
TX
t=1
X
st
q1t (s
t)cit(s
t) 
TX
t=1
X
st
q1t (s
t)yit(s
t):
The agent is value function V (i; i) in the working stage is solved in the equilibrium
where q1t (s
t) clear the markets for all st.
The education stage
In the working stage, as individuals have the same (observed) education levels (years) l, they
are assumed to have the same base wages w. There are (unobserved) di¤erences in education
quality as individuals may di¤er in their e¤orts. In specic, at age 0, the agent i chooses
an e¤ort level ei with an individual-specic utility cost function !i(ei), with
@!i(ei)
@ei
> 0 and
@2!i(ei)
@e2i
 0. This standard cost function captures all the individual-specic cognitive, non-
cognitive and nancial characteristics in education.
Assume the individual wage growth rate at time t to be increasing and weakly concave in
the agents e¤ort level, i.e. @it@ei > 0 and
@2it
@e2i
 0; for any t: This assumption can be justied as
follows: rst, the education quality is an increasing and concave function of e¤ort; second, the
learning ability as part of the education quality determines the individual income growth at any
time t, which can be viewed as a human capital accumulation model a la Hugget et al. (2011).
Although this model focuses on the choice of education quality instead of education quantity
(years), the main intuitions are the same and it is consistent with the empirical evidence that
the group of higher education is associated with higher wage growth rate.
The expected life-time utility after she enters the labor market can be solved in the working
stage as V (i; i). Thus the agent is optimization problem in the education stage is:
max
ei
 !i(ei) + 
l
iV (i; i):
3.2 Income growth rate and patience
For the whole population, we are interested in the following question: how does the agents
income growth rate correlate with patience? We can derive the following proposition:
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Proposition 1 The invidual income growth rate is positively correlated with the individual
patience, i.e. t; > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, the patient agent would exert more e¤ort because she has higher discounted
future benet than the impatient agent. As higher level of e¤ort generates higher education
quality and thus higher income growth rate, the endogenous income growth rate is increasing
in patience. It is easy to see that in the special case where we assume constant income growth
rate; we have ; > 0:
For simplicity, this model restricts the e¤ort choice to the education stage only. The
intuition still holds if we allow the agents to exert e¤ort in the working stage. The it; which
may be mis-specied as "shocks" to econometricians, are predictable to the individuals at time
t. The more patient agent is more willing to exert e¤ort to increase her human capital and
thus income growth it, because she always has, ceteris paribus, higher discounted benet of
e¤ort than the impatient agent at any working time t.
3.3 Comovement of consumption and income
Let i > 0 be the Lagrange multiplier of agent is life-time budget constraint, the rst-order
condition for agent i with history st is:
t 1i t(s
t)[cit(s
t)]  = iq
1
t (s
t): (3)
Notice that the marginal utility of consumption decreases with the individual discount
factor and increases with the Lagrange multiplier. We immediately know that the ratio of
consumption of any two individuals does not depend on their own income history; thus each
consumer will get full insurance and we can write cit(s
t) = cit for any s
t at t.
Denote ex as the logarithm of any variable x and sum up individual is consumption across all
the states at time t, we get from equation (3) the rst di¤erence of log consumption (individual
consumption growth rate):
ecit = 1

[ei   log
X
st
q1t (s
t)]; (4)
where  e    log  is approximately the discount rate if E()  1. Because the income
shocks are fully insured in complete markets, the individual consumption growth rate depends
on each agents discount factor, not the income shocks. Thus, in the OLS estimation by BPP
in equation (1), both the permanent and the transitory pass-throughs should be zero.
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However, the econometricians do not know each agents true income process. The best
thing they can do is to use the panel data of consumption and income for identication: if
they observe ones income and ones consumption are correlated, they conclude that there is
"uninsurable" income shock.
In practice, BPP estimate the comovement of consumption and income by instruments3:
bInstrt =E[ect(eyt 1 +eyt +eyt+1)]E[eyt(eyt 1 +eyt +eyt+1)] ; (5)
b Instrt =  E(ecteyt+1)E(eyteyt+1) : (6)
From equation (4) we know that the individual consumption growth rate is not directly
linked with the individual income. However, it is correlated with the individual discount
factor, and from Proposition 1 we know that the individual income growth rate and patience
are positive correlated. Therefore, BPPs measure by the instrument estimation would no
longer be zero. Formally, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In the complete market model, the BPPs estimators are
bt;CM = cov(e;t 1+t+t+1)b2;BPP =
cov(e;t 1+t+t+1)
fcov(t;t 1+t+t+1)+[(3 1)(1 2(t 2))=(+1)+( 1)+1]2g
;
b t;CM = cov(e;t+1)b2";BPP =
cov(e;t+1)
f2" cov(t;t+1) ( 1)[
3(2(t 1) 1)=(+1)+1]2g
;
where b2;BPP and b2";BPP are BPPs estimates of the variance of permanent and transitory
shocks, respectively. Therefore, the hypothesis of complete markets can NOT be rejected by the
observed positive bt;CM from BPPs test.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition simply says that the covariance of income growth rates and patience can
be transmitted into the comovement of consumption and income, which may cause the false
rejection of the hypothesis of complete maketes by BPPs estimation.
3.4 Consumption dispersion
Let i  1=i represent the Pareto weight in the corresponding social planners problem. As
we can see for any two agents i and j:
cit(s
t)
cjt(st)
= [(
i
j
)t 1
i
j
]
1
 : (7)
3Although the direct OLS and the instrument method are in principle di¤erent, Sun (2010) proves that both
the instrument and OLS estimators are consistent estimators of  and  ; if the consumption model (1) is not
mis-specied.
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If i = j , the relative consumption ratio is a constant which is determined at the beginning
of the life cycle. Testing constant relative marginal utility of consumption is the key logic of
the test of complete markets. If i 6= j ; however, the ratio between ci and cj will increase
exponentially with age. Consider two agents with i > j . Even if i < j , the impatient
agent will consume more in the beginning, but after some time the patient agent will catch up
and consume more and more afterwards. In that case the consumption dispersion is expected
to decrease at the very beginning, reaches zero after some time and increases convexly since
then.
The variance of log consumption can be computed as
var(ecit) = (t  1)
2
2
var(ei) + 2(t  1) cov(ei; ei) + var(ei): (8)
Notice that the last term in the right hand side is constant over the life-cycle, which is the
initial level of consumption dispersion. The rst term is increasing quadratically with age; the
second term is a linear function of age whose slope is dependent on the covariance between
patience and corresponding Pareto weight. At the beginning of life, the consumption dispersion
may decrease with age if cov(ei; ei) < 0; if t is su¢ciently large, the consumption dispersion
starts to increase convexly with age. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (i) In the complete market model, the consumption dispersion increases con-
vexly with age after t  t = e;e
e
e
+ 1: If e;e >  
T 1
2
e
e
, then the consumption dispersion
increases over the life cycle. Therefore, the hypothesis of complete markets can NOT be rejected
by the observed increasing consumption dispersion over the life cycle.
(ii) Consumption dispersion over the life cycle increases with t;:
Proof. See Appendix.
3.5 Bond economy with predictable income
Consider a special case of complete markets. The typical life-cycle model of consumption and
saving is widely used in the macroeconomics literature. Under this market structure, each
agent has only access to a one-period risk-free bond, with the gross interest R which clear the
bond markets.
Suppose that the idiosyncratic income change is fully predictable, then the individual con-
sumption can be fully smoothed by borrowing and saving through the bond market, i.e., the
markets are complete.
The agent is optimization problem at the working stage is:
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V (i; i) = max
TX
t=1
t 1i
c1 it
1  
s:t:
TX
t=1
cit
Rt 1

TX
t=1
yit
Rt 1
:
Because the econometricians do not know the agents true income process, the fully pre-
dictable income change might be mis-interpreted as "shocks" to the econometricians. The
variance of log consumption in the bond economy can be computed as
var(ecit) = (t  1)
2
2
var(ei) + 2(t  1) cov(ei; e
i) + var(e
i); (9)
where 
i 
TX
t=1
yit
Rt 1
=
TX
t=1
[iR
(1 )]
t 1
 . Note that the Pareto weight i in equation (8) now
has a concrete interpretation and it is decreasing in the present value of the life-time income.
The correlation between 
i and i might be negative. To have an increasing consumption
dispersion, it requires that this correlation to be not too negative, which can be helped by the
fact that the more patient agent would have higher life-time wealth. Formally, we can prove in
this model that it has the sample properties as shown in the previous case of complete market
model with stochastic income process.
Proposition 4 In the bond economy with predictable income change (a special complete mar-
ket model),
(i)the BPP estimators bt;CM and b t;CM are the same as in the complete market model.
(ii) the consumption dispersion increases convexly with age after t  t = e
;e
e

e
+
1: If e
;e >  
T 1
2
e
e

, then the consumption dispersion increases over the life cycle. The
consumption dispersion over the life cycle increases with t; :
Therefore, the hypothesis of bond economy with predictable income change can NOT be
rejected by either the positive bt;CM or the increasing consumption dispersion over the life
cycle.
Proof. See Appendix.
In sum, the empirical evidence of the two most popular risk sharing tests is not enough
to reveal the true nature of market structure and income shocks. Allowing for heterogeneous
discount rates and heterogeneous income growth rates, we can reject neither the hypothesis of
complete markets nor the hypothesis of fully predictable income.
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4 Quantitative Implications
Theoretically, I have shown that a complete market model can pass the risk sharing tests.
To go one step further, I will investigate the quantitative signicance of the risk sharing tests
when markets are complete. I will rst discuss the relative insurability between permanent
and transitory shocks as implied by my model, and then I ask: with plausible parameters, is
it quantitatively admissible for a complete market model to match the observed increase of
consumption dispersion, the comovement of consumption and income, or even both simulta-
neously?
Relative insurability
If the markets are incomplete, the permanent shocks are more di¢cult to insure against
than the transitory shocks. The pass-through of transitory shocks in BPP is 0:0533, which is
not signicantly from zero and close to the interest rate, consistent with the Permanent Income
/ Life Cycle Hypothesis. The most informative result of BPPs estimation is the pass-through
of permanent shocks bBPP = 0:6422. BPP call it partial insurance. On the one hand, it is
less than the one-to-one response of consumption to income in the standard PILCH model as
discussed in Section 2, indicating that there is some risk-sharing over and above self-insurance.
On the other hand, the magnitude of the pass-through of permanent shocks is more than
10 times larger than that of transitory shocks, which highlights the huge di¤erence in the
insurability between permanent and transitory shocks and thus is at odds with the hypothesis
of complete markets.
I would argue that the relative magnitude of pass-through between permanent and transi-
tory shocks may not indicate the relative insurability and the huge di¤erence in pass-throughs
may not reject the hypothesis of complete markets. Quantitatively, the ratio between the
pass-through of permanent shocks and transitory shocks is less informative than we previously
thought. To see this, notice that according to Proposition 2, we can write the ratio between the
pass-through of permanent shocks to consumption and the pass-through of transitory shocks
to consumption as: bt;CM
b t;CM
=
cov(it 1 + it + it+1; ei)
cov(it+1; ei)
b2";BPP
b2;BPP : (10)
This ratio tells us the relative insurability between permanent and transitory shocks. As-
sume cov(it 1; ei; )  cov(it; ei; )  cov(it+1; ei); and it becomes
bt;CM
b t;CM

3b2";BPP
b2;BPP : (11)
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This is an easily testable implication of the complete market model. If in the data we have
the (mis-specied) estimation of the variances of shocks, we can predict this ratio without the
knowledge of cov(i; i) or :
Table 1
Sample Source b2;BPP b2";BPP bt;CMb t;CM
1979-1981 BPP(2008) 0:0102 0:0368 10:8
1990-1992 BPP(2008) 0:0134 0:0506 11:3
1969-1992 STY(2004) 0:0161 0:063 11:7
1967-1992 Guvenen(2009) 0:015 0:061 12:2
1979-1992 bBPP =b BPP = 0:6423=0:0533 = 12:1
In Table 1, I list the estimates of permanent and transitory shocks in longer periods by
BPP(2008)4, Storesletten et al. (2004) and Guvenen (2009) with the restriction of 2 = 0.
All these estimates are from PSID. The ratio between permanent and transitory pass-throughs
constructed in the complete market model ranges from 10:8 to 12:2; by BPPs measurement of
the comovement of consumption and income, this ratio is 12:1. This is a stunning quantitative
result. Without any information of consumption data at all, this rule-of-thumb prediction
from this parsimonious complete market model has done a good job in predicting the relative
insurability between permanent and transitory shocks, which is quantitatively consistent with
the estimates from BPPs panel data of consumption and income. The key message of BPP
is that the magnitude of permanent shocks is more than 10 times larger than the magnitude
of transitory shocks, and yet the prediction of the complete market model indicates that we
should not simply interpret this message as the strong evidence for market incompleteness.
Admissible parameter values
To quantitatively confront the model with the absolute value of the pass-through of shocks,
I assume that it = t. The formula for the pass-through of permanent shocks becomes
bt;CM = 1 ;e
3e
2;BPP
: (12)
Note that bt;CM can also be interpreted as the down-ward bias of the degree of risk-sharing by
BPPs method. It depends on the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and the correlation
between income growth rate and patience. 2;BPP is set to be 0:0118, which is the average
of BPPs estimation during 1979-1981 and 1990-1992 period in PSID. i and ei are assumed
to follow joint Normal distribution with mean  = e = 0. e is set to be 0:087, which is
4 In BPP, the variance of permanent and transitory shocks are reported almost yearly and vary immensely
over 1979-1992. The only two sample periods with more than one year are 1979-1981 and 1990-1992. I consider
the estimates from these two periods to be more robust and comparable with the estimates from other authors.
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Alan and Browning (2006)s structural estimation of the food consumption in PSID. As   1,
we have e   when e is small. For heterogeneous income growth rates, I use Guvenen
(2009)s estimation in PSID:  = 0:0195:
The empirical target for the comovement of consumption and income is naturally the pass-
through of permanent shocks estimated by BPP: bBPP = 0:642. If we can match the model
with the permanent pass-through, the transitory pass-through will be approximately matched
as we have already known that the ratio between these two is consistent with the data.
The other restriction on  and 
;e
is derived from the life cycle increase of the consumption
dispersion in a bond economy with predictable income, a special complete market model.
(T   1)2
2
2
e
+
2(T   1)

cov(ei; e
i) = 1;T var(ecit): (13)
The implicit function of e and ;e can be approximated numerically using simulation
of covariance. The gross interest rate R is set to 1:04. It is convenient to do this in the
bond economy with predicable income than in an Arrow-Debreu economy and e
i can be
easily simulated. The empirical target for the consumption dispersion is from Heathcote et al.
(2010a). I set T = 31, as they report the age prole of consumption dispersion for average 5
years group, starting from age 27 (average of 25 to 30) to age 57 (average of age 55 to 60).
They nd that the variance of log consumption rises by 0:057 over the life cycle, controlling
for year e¤ects.
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Admissible Parameter Values:  and 
;e
Figure 1 plots the conditions for admissible 
;e
and : The downward sloping black line
matches Heathcote et al. (2010a)s empirical increase of consumption dispersion over the life
cycle and the upward sloping red line matches BPPs empirical comovement of consumption
and income. These two lines do intersect at a unique pair of 
;e
= 0:86 and  = 0:60:
The relative risk aversion is low, but it is comparable with Gourinchas and Parker (2002)s
estimate of  = 0:51 by matching the consumption prole over the life cycle in CEX. It should
be noted that: as the preference parameters are unobservable and the income growth rates
are unknown to the econometricians, those estimates have already exploited the information of
consumption and income. Based on the parameterization which is not model-free, it is too soon
to claim the success (or failure) of a complete model by matching (or fail to match) the data.
Nevertheless, the key message of this quantitative exercise is: even a parsimonious complete
market model, with plausible parameter values, is able to simultaneously account for both the
empirical estimates of these two types of risk sharing measures.
According to equation (12), all pairs of positive 
;e
and  generate positive comovement of
consumption and income. I also plot a dashed line to match zero consumption dispersion over
the life cycle. Those pairs which lie to the northeast of this line are quantitatively admissible
parameters of 
;e
and  for generating both the positive life-cycle increase of consumption
dispersion and the positive comovement of consumption and income; these are the admissible
parameter values which would cause the false rejection of the complete market model by the
previous risk sharing tests.
The role of ; is crucial. To generate a positive comovement of consumption and income,
; must be positive. With a high , the empirical estimated degree of discount rate hetero-
geneity is su¢cient to generate an increasing consumption dispersion over the life cycle: But
with a low , the positive correlation between income growth rate and patience is quantitatively
necessary.
5 Conclusion
This paper revisits the recent risk sharing tests which use micro data sets of consumption
and income distributions. These tests reject the hypothesis of complete markets because in the
data: (1) the individual consumption comoves with income and (2) the consumption dispersion
increases over the life cycle. These evidence cannot be reconciled with any standard complete
market models.
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I extend the standard complete market model with the endogenously formed positive corre-
lation between income growth rate and patience, a model feature consistent with the empirical
evidence on patience, education and income growth. The main result is: it is not only theoret-
ically possible, but also quantitatively admissible for a parsimonious complete market model
to account for the empirical evidence on both the comovement of consumption and income
and the increasing consumption dispersion over the life cycle. I conclude that the previous risk
sharing tests using micro data sets from consumption and income distributions may underes-
timate the degree of risk sharing and therefore are not su¢cient for rejecting the hypothesis
of complete markets.
Casting doubt on the previous risk sharing tests, this paper highlights the importance of
the discount rate heterogeneity in general equilibrium models as emphasized by Browning et
al. (1999) and it is the rst step towards future research in two directions. One is to design
a more proper risk sharing test which does not merely rely on the information of either the
consumption dispersion or the comovement of consumption and income. The other is to do the
structural estimation of the ex-ante heterogeneity, starting from a complete market framework
instead of the more complicated incomplete market models, from which we may learn more
about the nature of market structure, the nature of income process and its relationship with
discount rate heterogeneity.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proofs
Proof. (Proposition 1)
In the education stage, the optimal e¤ort level is given by
li
TX
t=1
[
@V (it; i)
@it
@it
@ei
] =
@!i(e

i )
@ei
:
From the implicit function theorem, we get
dei
di
=  
l 1i
PT
t=1
@it
@ei
[ @V (it;i)@it@i
+  @V (it;i)@it ]
li
PT
t=1[
@V (it;i)
@it
@2it
@e2i
+ (@it@ei )
2
PT
t=1
@2V (it;i)
@2it
] 
@2!i(ei )
@e2i
:
In the working stage, the life-time present value of income is increasing in i. We have
@V (it;i)
@it
> 0,@V (it;i)@it@i
> 0 and @
2V (it;i)
@2it
< 0; which come from the standard properties of
the consumers problem. As @it@ei > 0;
@2it
@e2i
 0;
@2!i(e

i )
@e2i
 0; we can immediately guarantee
that
dei
di
> 0.
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Since @it@ei > 0; we have
@it
@i
> 0. Finally, the property of the covariance of two increasing
functions yields cov(it; i) > 0 and t; > 0:
Proof. (Proposition 2)
The "true" pass-through of permanent shocks to consumption growth can be estimated
by OLS: since cov(ect; t) = cov(ect; "t) = 0 in complete market model, the pass-through of
permanent and transitory shocks would both be zero. From the data, however, the econome-
tricians cannot observe t and "t. BPP suggest instrument estimation to get the variance and
covariance needed. The variance of permanent shocks is identied as:
b2;BPP = E[eyt(eyt 1 +eyt +eyt+1)]
= E[(it + (  1)zt 2 + (  1)t 1 + t + "t   "t 1)
(it 1 + it + it+1 + t+1 + t + 
2t 1 + (
3   1)zt 2 + "t+1   "t 2)
= cov(it; it 1 + it + it+1) + (  1)(
3   1)var(zt 2) + [
2(  1) + ]2
= cov(it; it 1 + it + it+1) + [(  1)(
3   1)
t 2X
=1
2( 1) + (  1) + 1]2
= cov(it; it 1 + it + it+1) + [(
3   1)(1  2(t 2))=(+ 1) + (  1) + 1]2:
The covariance of consumption growth and permanent shocks is identied as
E(ect(eyt 1 +eyt +eyt+1))
= E[
ei   logPst q1t (st)

(it 1 + t + t+1 + t+1 + t + 
2t 1 + (
3   1)zt 2 + "t+1   "t 2)]
=
cov(it 1 + it + it+1; ei)

:
The last step uses the fact that  log
P
st q
1
t (s
t) is not individual i specic. Hence,
bt;CM = E(ect(eyt 1 +eyt +eyt+1))E(eyt(eyt 1 +eyt +eyt+1))
=
cov(ei; it 1 + it + it+1)
b2;BPP
=
cov(it 1 + it + it+1; ei)
fcov(it; it 1 + it + it+1) + [(3   1)(1  2(t 2))=(+ 1) + (  1) + 1]2g
:
17
The variance of transitory shocks is identied as:
b2";BPP = E(eyteyt+1)
= E[(it + (  1)zt 1 + t + "t   "t 1)
(it+1 + (  1)zt 1 + (  1)t + t+1 + "t+1   "t)]
= cov(it; it+1)  
2
" + (  1)
2var(zt 1) + (  1)
2

= cov(it; it+1)  
2
" + (  1)[(  1)
t 1X
=1
2 + 1]2
= 2"   cov(it; it+1)  (  1)[
3(2(t 1)   1)=(+ 1) + 1]2:
The covariance of consumption growth and transitory shocks is identied as
E(ecteyt+1)
= E[(
ei   logPst q1t (st)

)(it+1 + (1  )zt + t+1 + "t+1   "t)]
=
1

cov(it+1; ei):
Hence,
b t;CM =  E(ecteyt+1)E(eyteyt+1)
=
cov(e; t+1)
b2";BPP
=
cov(it+1; ei)
f2"   cov(it; it+1)  (  1)[
3(2(t 1)   1)=(+ 1) + 1]2g
:
The BPPs test of complete market comes from the fact that if  = 0; we get cov(t+1; e) =
0 and thus bt;CM = 0. As the logarithm function is an increasing function, t > 0 implies
cov(t; e) > 0 and thus the empirical nding of bt;CM > 0 cannot reject the hypothesis of
complete markets.
Proof. (Proposition 3)
The variance of log consumption is given by
var(ecit) = (t  1)
2
2
var(ei) + 2(t  1) cov(ei; ei) + var(ei):
The rst statement comes directly from the quadratic function of t. We get t by letting the
derivative of the variance of log consumption to t be zero. Letting var(eciT ) > var(eci1); we get
the condition for the increasing consumption dispersion over the life cycle.
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Summing up the rst order conditions (3) over all the states at time t; the individual
consumption at time t can be derived as
cit = 
t 1

i 
1

i [
X
st
q1t (s
t)]
1
 :
Substituting cit into the budget constraint, we get

1=
i =
P
t
X
st
q1t (s
t)yit(s
t)
P
tf
t 1

i [
P
st q
1
t (s
t)]
1

+1
g
:
The numerator of the right hand side is the present value of the life-time income, which
is increasing in it: As t; increases, cov(
ei; ei) would increase and thus the consumption
dispersion over the life cycle increases.
Proof. (Proposition 4)
In the working stage, the agent is log consumption can be solved as
ecit = log(iR)

(t  1)  log
TX
t=1
[iR
(1 )]
t 1
 + logWi;
where Wi 
TX
t=1
yit
Rt 1
is the present value of life-time wealth. The increase of log consumption
from t  1 to t is:
ecit =
ei

:
Compare it with equation (4) in the previous case of Arrow-Debreu economy with stochastic
economy. The di¤erences are not individual-specic and thus the covariance between ecit and
any individual income changes would remain the same, which proves the rst part of this
proposition.
The variance of log consumption in the bond economy can be computed as
var(ecit) = (t  1)
2
2
var(ei) + 2(t  1) cov(ei; e
i) + var(e
i);
where 
i 
TX
t=1
yit
Rt 1
=
TX
t=1
[iR
(1 )]
t 1
 . The second term is a linear function of t whose slope
is determined by cov(ei; e
i). We get the t by letting the derivative of the variance of log
consumption to t be zero. Letting var(eciT ) > var(eci1); we get the condition for the increasing
consumption dispersion over the life cycle. Since the life-time wealth Wi is increasing in i,
higher t; would yield larger cov(
ei; e
i) and thus higher var(ecit).
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